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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the political economy of immigration policy in
a direct democracy setting. We formulate a structural model of voting and
participation behavior integrating instrumental and expressive motivations.
The model is estimated using data drawn from a survey carried out after a
vote in Switzerland in 2000 on a popular initiative proposing to implement
immigration restrictions. The model enables us to recover estimates of par-
ticipation costs and preferences towards immigration and analyze how these
preferences are translated into actual political outcomes. The results reveal a
substantial gap (“participation bias”) between attitudes towards immigration
in the general population and the outcome of the vote.
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In many countries of the Northern Hemisphere, opinion polls show that a majority
of residents would prefer to reduce the number of immigrants to their country. For
example, in the 1995 survey of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP),
more than 50 percent of respondents in 20 countries say that the number of immi-
grants should be reduced a little or a lot. Even in the four countries of the sample
where this is not the case (Ireland, Spain, Japan and Canada) more respondents are
in favor of reducing immigration than in favor of increasing immigration.
These responses reveal a discrepancy between the immigration policies of these
countries and popular demands for tighter immigration control. Here we have a
puzzle for the analysis of the political economy of migration: Why is public opinion
not accurately reﬂected in actual policies? According to Chiswick and Hatton (2003)
this puzzle should be addressed by answering two questions: (1) what drives public
opinion and (2) why is it not reﬂected in policy?
According to Rodrik (1995), an adequate description of individual preferences
should indeed be the ﬁrst element of a political economy model. However, under-
standing how preferences on immigration are formed is not enough: the model must
also “contain a description of how these individual preferences are aggregated and
channeled (...) into political demands for a particular policy or another”. Finally,
the policymakers’ preferences and the institutional setting should be speciﬁed. It
is in these latter elements that an explanation for the immigration policy puzzle
should be sought.
In this paper, we address Chiswick and Hatton’s puzzle in a direct democracy
setting. We formulate a structural model of voting and participation behavior in
order to analyze the political economy of immigration policy in the Swiss context.
The model is estimated using data collected after a vote in September 2000 on a
popular initiative proposing to restrict immigration. The model enables us, on the
one hand, to recover estimates of preferences towards immigration and to analyze, on
the other hand, how these preferences are translated into actual political outcomes
in the context of a direct democracy. We will discuss these aspects in turn.
Let us ﬁrst consider the problem of identifying attitudes towards immigration.
The use of individual survey data on voting behavior allows us to connect two exist-
ing strands of literature and to overcome some of the weaknesses inherent in each of
these approaches. The ﬁrst approach (Goldin, 1994; Timmer and Williamson, 1998)
focuses on political outcomes and tries to draw conclusions on attitudes towards im-
1migration.1 This approach is not unproblematic since the link between preferences
towards immigration and policy outcomes depends on the institutional context and
the mapping from attitudes to outcomes might not be unambiguous (Scheve and
Slaughter, 2001). This diﬃculty is not present in our model, since the link between
preferences and the outcome of the vote is explicitly modeled.
The second approach in the literature ignores the institutional context and fo-
cuses on individual attitudes by analyzing individual opinion polls.2 The ambiguities
inherent in the ﬁrst approach are thereby avoided but another problem arises: opin-
ion polls are likely to suﬀer from the so-called “hypothetical bias” since individuals
have little incentive to reveal their true preferences, knowing that their answer will
have no real consequences.3
A vote on a popular initiative or a referendum in Switzerland provides a context
which diﬀers fundamentally from opinion polls. First, the result of the vote is
binding: the acceptance of a popular initiative by vote implies a change in the
Swiss Constitution.4 Therefore, citizens are aware that the collective decision will
have actual consequences. Second, the political discussion preceding a vote enables
individuals to take a more informed decision on the issue up for vote than is the case
when answering an opinion poll. Cognitive problems caused by question wording and
framing are therefore less likely to occur in the voting context. Moreover, uninformed
individuals are less likely to participate in a vote because of the associated costs. In
the context of an opinion poll, the same individuals may be reluctant to admit a lack
of attitude or may make little mental eﬀort in answering the questions (Bertrand
1For example, Goldin (1994) analyzes the historical move towards immigration restrictions in
the US between 1890 and 1923 (in particular, the repeated tentative to introduce a literacy test
for immigrants) by assuming that Senators and Representatives defend policies that represent the
views of their local constituents.
2Scheve and Slaughter (2001) use data from diﬀerent waves of the National Election Studies
(NES) surveys in the U.S. whereas Mayda (2005) and O’Rourke and Sinnott (2005) use the 1995
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). All these authors rely in their analysis on questions
asking whether the number of immigrants in the country should be reduced, remain the same
or should be increased. Other studies on attitudes to immigration are Citrin et al. (1997) and
Espenshade and Hempstead (1996). See also Hanson et al. (2005) and Facchini and Mayda (2006)
who analyze the role of the welfare state in the formation of preferences towards immigration.
3Cummings et al. (1995) and Cummings et al. (1997) provide experimental evidence on hypo-
thetical bias in the context of contingent valuation methods. Cummings et al. (1995) test (and
reject) the hypothesis that hypothetical surveys are incentive-compatible in the context of dichoto-
mous choice involving private goods. Cummings et al. (1997) arrive at a similar conclusion for
hypothetical referenda using majority rule.
4In Switzerland, any population group can use this political instrument in order to propose a
change in the Constitution. To be voted upon, a popular initiative must obtain 100,000 signatures
(50,000 signatures before 1977). A second important direct-democracy instrument is the referen-
dum: Laws or Federal orders voted by the Parliament are put to vote if a group obtains 50,000
signatures. Again, the decision is binding for the government.
2and Mullainathan, 2001).5
Despite the diﬀerent approaches, our results concerning individual preferences
towards immigration conﬁrm the main ﬁndings of Scheve and Slaughter (2001),
Mayda (2005) and O’Rourke and Sinnott (2005). Indicators of human capital ap-
pear to have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on individual attitudes towards immigration, as
predicted by standard economic models. Non-economic factors, in particular polit-
ical ideology, also play an important role. Interestingly, a simple probit regression
on the sample of individuals who expressed their vote does not reveal a signiﬁcant
inﬂuence of human capital variables on attitudes towards immigration. Only the
joint estimation of the full model uncovers such a relationship.
Let us now turn to the problem of the link between preferences and political
outcomes. By modeling a single vote on immigration restrictions, we do not claim to
represent the entire political process leading to the formation of immigration policy
in Switzerland. In particular, the roles of the Swiss government, Parliament and
pressure groups is neglected in our analysis. It should nevertheless be emphasized
that the evolution of immigration policy over the last 40 years has been decisively
inﬂuenced by popular votes (Piguet and Mahnig, 2000; de Melo et al., 2004; Miguet,
2007). In certain circumstances, government decisions even anticipate the outcome
of a popular vote. In order to prevent a popular initiative from being accepted, it
is common that the government takes decisions in advance that fulﬁll some of the
initiative’s demands.6
How should the voting and participation decisions be modeled in view of the
Chiswick-Hatton puzzle? As the huge literature on the “voting paradox” attests,
there is no generally accepted theory of voting.7 On the one hand, there are in-
strumental theories which assume that the individual’s contribution to the outcome
of the vote is the main motivation for participation. Individuals participate in the
vote if the expected beneﬁt from voting is higher than the cost of voting. As the
probability of casting the decisive vote is extremely small in large electorates, there
is a general consensus that these theories are unable to explain the observed turnout
rates.
5Surveys on elections or votes, such as the one we use in this paper, are not entirely exempt
from this kind of problems. According to Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), voter participation
is overreported because respondents want to avoid looking bad in the eyes of the interviewer. For
our purposes, this seems however a minor problem compared to the weaknesses inherent in the
results of opinion polls.
6An example of such a procedure is the introduction of immigration quotas in the early 1970s,
when a xenophobic popular initiative was up for vote.
7For recent surveys of this literature, see Aldrich (1993), Blais (2000), Dhillon and Peralta
(2002), Mueller (2003) and Dowding (2005).
3Empirical studies suggest nevertheless that instrumental motivations matter at
the margin. Turnout is higher if the expected outcome is close or if there is more
at stake in the vote (Blais, 2000; Dowding, 2005). For empirical purposes, it is
therefore useful to combine the instrumental approach with other explanations of
voting behavior. Recent research suggests that group-based explanations or theories
based on expressive motivations provide better explanations of observed turnout
(Coate and Conlin, 2004; Coate et al., 2004).
We account for these expressive and group-based motivations by introducing so-
cial identity or self-image. According to Akerlof and Kranton (2000), individuals
take identity-related payoﬀs into account in many situations. Their approach is use-
ful in our context since identity considerations can be expected to play an important
role in the act of voting. The role of identity is prominent in the expressive account
of voting. Brennan and Hamlin (1998) compare voting to cheering at a football
match. According to Schuessler (2000) it is the voter’s statement of her preference
for the Democratic candidate that makes the voter a Democrat. In other words, the
act of voting helps to deﬁne the citizen’s political identity as a Democrat.
In the framework of Akerlof and Kranton (2000), each individual considers herself
part of a social category. There are prescriptions that indicate the ideal behavior
for members of each category. In the context of voting on immigration policy, we
assume that citizens have a political identity by feeling close to a political group.
These groups have varying prescriptions with respect to the voting and participation
decisions. For example, an individual who considers herself as belonging to the “left”
will feel pressed to participate in the vote and to oppose immigration restrictions.
An early contribution that stresses similar motivations for voting is Fiorina (1976).
He introduces an expressive factor in the utility function which represents the utility
or disutility of satisfying or violating one’s party allegiance.
We propose a structural model combining instrumental and expressive motiva-
tions in a theoretical framework that explains both voting preferences and participa-
tion decisions. Our model represents an improvement on previous empirical studies
of individual voting decisions that have used more descriptive modeling approaches
(e.g. de Melo et al., 2004; Miguet 2007; Thalmann, 2004). By following a struc-
tural approach, we are able to explicitly identify, in particular, the determinants of
participation costs in addition to those of voting preferences.
Our econometric results show that both instrumental and expressive factors mat-
ter for voting and participation decisions. Moreover, there is a strong positive cor-
relation between the error terms of the two equations describing attitudes towards
4immigration and participation costs. As a result, there is a substantial “participa-
tion bias”: the outcome of the vote does not reﬂect the underlying preferences of
the whole population because citizens in favor of immigration restrictions tend to
participate much less in the vote than those who are against such restrictions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents
a theoretical framework for our analysis. This is followed by a formulation of the
econometric model and a discussion of the estimation method in Section 3. Section 4
describes the data used and empirical results are analyzed in Section 5. The paper
ends with some concluding remarks in Section 6.
2 The model
In order to analyze the political economy of migration in the context of Swiss direct
democracy, we formulate a structural model of voting and participation. In this
section, we develop our framework in three steps. First, the link between immi-
gration restrictions and individual income (or utility) of citizens is spelled out in
a simple framework. This link is fundamental for the instrumental component of
the voting model which is presented in the second step. The third step consists in
adding political identity considerations to the model.
2.1 Economic consequences of immigration restrictions
Two types of models have been traditionally used in the literature in order to eval-
uate the economic consequences of immigration. Labor economists traditionally
cast their analysis in the framework of factor-proportions analysis (FPA), assuming
an aggregate production function with a single output and several primary factors:
capital and labor (which is often disaggregated by skill). In this model, the labor
demand schedule for each skill is downward-sloping and immigration tends to de-
crease wages of similarly skilled natives. By contrast, trade economists often resort
to the Heckscher-Ohlin model with more traded goods than factors. The output
mix of national production is determined by the country’s endowment in primary
factors. If national production is fully diversiﬁed (i.e. if the number of goods is equal
to the number of factors), factor prices are entirely determined by goods prices on
the world market and a small level of immigration changes the output mix without
aﬀecting wages and other factor prices. However, if immigration is suﬃciently im-
portant to change the set of goods produced in the economy, wages will be adversely
aﬀected by the arrival of immigrants.
5In the following paragraphs, we outline a simple model where human capital is
measured as a continuous variable (as in our empirical application) and immigration
restrictions imply a ﬁnite change in labor supply. This framework is closely related
to the FPA and nicely illustrates the relation between redistributive eﬀects and
the aggregate welfare impact of immigration restrictions. In our simple framework,
there are two production factors (human capital and “raw” labor) and individuals
are heterogeneous in their endowments of human capital.
Suppose there are LN national citizens (who have the right to vote) and LM
immigrants in the economy. Each individual i supplies one unit of “raw” labor and hi
units of human capital. Aggregate output is given by Y = F(H,L), where L = LN+
LM and H =
 
i hi and F is an aggregate production function exhibiting constant
returns to scale. Per capita output can be written as y ≡ Y/L= F(H/L,1) ≡ f(h),
where h = H/L is the average per capita human capital stock.8
With perfectly competitive factor markets and proﬁt maximization by the rep-
resentative ﬁrm, prices and marginal products of production factors are equalized.
Marginal products are given by f (h) (human capital) and f(h)−hf (h) (raw labor).
Earnings of individual i (with hi units of human capital and 1 unit of raw labor)
can therefore be written as
wi = f(h) − hf
 (h)+hif
 (hi)=f(h)+( hi − h)f
 (h). (1)
Thus in the (h,w) space, individual earnings of all individuals lie on a straight line
that is tangent to the aggregate production function f at the average per capita
human capital stock, h.
When confronted with a proposal to reduce the number of immigrants in Switzer-
land, a Swiss citizen will compare the status quo (which will be indicated with su-
perscript 0) with a hypothetical situation that would arise if the popular initiative
were accepted (superscript 1). As argued in the introduction, a more restrictive
stance with respect to immigration policy is likely to increase the average human
capital of immigrants. We therefore assume that h1 >h 0.
8Physical capital can be added to the model without changing the qualitative conclusions
if perfect international mobility of capital is assumed. To see this, deﬁne aggregate output
as Y = G(K,H,L), where G is an aggregate production function with constant returns to
scale. A factor-price constrained revenue function (Neary, 1985) can be deﬁned as ˜ G(r,H,L)=
maxK{G(K,H,L) − rK}. With the world rental rate of capital r∗ given, the optimal stock of
physical capital is deﬁned implicitly by ∂G/∂K = r∗ and ˜ G has the same properties as an uncon-
strained revenue (or aggregate production) function, as shown by Neary (1985). Moreover, ˜ G is
linearly homogeneous with respect to H and L. Therefore, if we assume that r∗ does not change
with immigration, we can redeﬁne f as follows: f(h)= ˜ G(r∗,H/L,1).
6In terms of an individual’s earnings, the diﬀerence between the two situations





i = −S +( hi − h
1)Δr, (2)
where Δr = f (h1) − f (h0) represents the change in the return to human capital
and S = f(h0)+(h1−h0)f (h0)−f(h1) is the (foregone) immigration surplus which
is lost as a result of the immigration restriction. Whereas S represents an aggregate
eﬃciency loss, identical for all remaining residents, the second term on the right
hand side of (2) varies among individuals; it captures the redistributional impact of
immigration restrictions. As the return to human capital falls with the increase in
h, those individuals whose human capital stock exceed the average per capita level h
lose from the immigration restriction; the others tend to beneﬁt. For the empirical
model spelled out below, we retain the fact that the expected change in income from
the popular initiative is a linear function of an individual’s human capital.
This model can be easily generalized to the case of the small open economy. If we
assume that there is an arbitrary number of goods produced by diﬀerent technologies
in the world economy, the home country produces either one good (specialized case)
or two goods (diversiﬁed case), depending on the home country’s relative human
capital endowment. If two goods are produced by the home country, the return to
human capital is entirely determined by relative goods prices in the world market
and a small immigration restriction does not aﬀect relative wage rates. However,
if the immigration restriction is suﬃciently strong, the economy is likely to quit
the initial diversiﬁed zone and enter either a new zone of specialization or a new
diversiﬁed zone (where two goods, one of them diﬀerent, are produced). In both
cases, the return to human capital increases with the immigration restriction and the
variation in income is a linear function of human capital, as in the closed economy
case.9
2.2 Instrumental motivations for voting
In the next step, we integrate the economic model in a rational voter framework.
From the point of view of the voter, there are two “states of nature”: the popular
9Another extension of this simple model would be the introduction of redistributional taxation
and social beneﬁts (as in Hanson et al., 2005; Facchini and Mayda, 2006). In the politico-economic
framework that we use here, a meaningful analysis of this issue should take into account the
interdependence of migration and redistribution policies. This would imply the introduction of a
second dimension in the policy choice of voters which goes beyond the scope of our paper.
7initiative will be accepted (j = 1) or rejected (j = 0). Utility in each of these states






i ), where X
j
i includes non-economic factors that inﬂuence
the voter’s preferences on immigration.
The individual proceeds in two stages. First, she considers the voting decision,
denoted by vi: individual i is in favor of the popular initiative (vi =1 )i fU1
i >U 0
i .
In the opposite case, she prefers the status quo (vi = 0). Second, the individual
decides whether to participate in the vote, by comparing the expected beneﬁts from
voting with costs of participation. Participation is denoted by πi = 1 and abstention
by πi =0 .
The expected utility of individual i taking action k is
EUi|k = PkU
1









where Pk denotes the perceived probability that the popular initiative is accepted if
the individual takes action k (the diﬀerent possible actions are: vote yes; vote no;
abstain). This probability depends on the individual’s prior beliefs on the outcome
of the vote, such as opinion polls and results of former referenda (Fischer, 1999). In
the empirical implementation of the model, it is taken to be a constant.10
The expected utility gain from participating in the vote can then be written as




i )   pui (4)




i )  − pui (5)
where ui ≡ U1
i − U0
i and p is the probability that the individual’s vote is decisive
(approximately equal to Py − Pa   Pa − Pn). An individual decides to vote if these
beneﬁts exceeds his participation costs, denoted by Ci.
The link with the traditional presentation of the rational voter model, initiated
by Downs (1957) and surveyed by Blais (2000) and Mueller (2003), can now be
made clear. The expected beneﬁt from voting (commonly denoted by B)i sg i v e n
by |ui| = |U1
i − U0
i | and the individual decides to participate if
p|ui|−Ci > 0. (6)
10Since we apply our framework to a single vote, this seems to be a reasonable assumption to
make. Moreover, the survey data that we use in our empirical application does not include a
question on the perceived closeness of the vote. In any case, this variable does not appear to to
be a good predictor of individual participation in cross-sectional studies (Aldrich, 1993; Mueller,
2003).
8The probability p that a vote is decisive has been widely discussed in the litera-
ture.11 As we focus on immigration policy, the expected beneﬁt from voting can be
made more precise by referring to the economic model outlined above. Assuming
that individuals are risk-neutral, utility can be deﬁned as a linear function of earn-
ings. Therefore the utility diﬀerence between the popular initiative and the status
quo can be written as
ui = β0 + β1hi,β 0 = −S − h
1Δr, β1 =Δ r (7)
Participation costs Ci include resource and time costs that each individual incurs
for voting as well as for acquiring the necessary information. The act of voting itself
requires little time and eﬀort. There are, however, individual diﬀerences in time
costs due for instance to voting procedures at the canton level. Moreover, acquiring
the relevant information on the issue up for vote might be rather time consuming,
especially for citizens with a low level of education.
2.3 Adding political identity to the model
As a last step, we extend the instrumental model in order to account for feelings
of political identity. We follow Akerlof and Kranton (2000) who propose a general
framework for incorporating identity in the utility function. In their framework, each
individual considers herself part of a social category or group g and assigns other
individuals to the diﬀerent social categories. For each social category, there are
prescriptions that indicate the behavior which is considered appropriate in diﬀerent
situations for individuals belonging to that category.
We introduce political identity or self-image into the utility function by adding
a new term Ii to the expected utility in equation (3). According to Akerlof and
Kranton (2000, 2005), an agent’s utility from her identity or self-image depends on
her assignment to a social category and on the match between her actions and the
prescribed ideal actions for her category. In the context of voting and participation
decisions, we assume that utility from identity is given by:
Ii = ψ(πi,v i;g)=τgi − 2agπi|˜ vg − vi|−bg|˜ πg − πi|. (8)
11See the references given in footnote 7 and Fischer (1999). Most of these authors point out
that, in the context of a large electorate, game-theoretic considerations do not add much to the
decision-theoretic explanation of the observed turnout in practical applications. See also Coate et
al. (2004) who show that a simple expressive voting model outperforms the pivotal-voter model
even in the case of small-scale elections.
9This utility function has three components. First, individual i derives a certain
utility τgi from belonging to social category g independently of her actions. The
second and third components of equation (8) reﬂect the consequences of acting
according to the prescriptions of one’s social category. Each social category g has a
prescribed ideal behavior with respect to participation (˜ πg) and voting (˜ vg) decisions.
An individual who identiﬁes herself with group g suﬀers a utility loss if she does not
live up to the ideal. The extent of this loss is captured by parameters ag and bg
which reﬂect the importance of living up to the ideal for members of group g.
We assume that an individual who disagrees with the ideal voting decision of her
group will suﬀer a loss in utility only if she expresses this preference by participating
in the vote. If she abstains from voting, the diﬀerence in opinion does not become
salient and does not result in a utility loss (the individual may not even be aware of
this diﬀerence in opinion since she does not express her opinion in a vote).
In Switzerland, the debate on migration policy became increasingly polarized
along the right-left axis during the 1990s. As our focus is on political identity, we
distinguish four social categories (or political groups) according to their political
position. The ﬁrst two groups that we consider are politically mobilized but occupy
opposite positions on the political scale: the “left” (l) and the “right” (r). For both
groups, we would expect that the ideal behavior consists in participating in the
election (˜ πr =˜ πl = 1). From an ideological point of view, the “left” rejects the idea
of restricting immigration (˜ vl = 0) whereas the “right” is in favor of the popular
initiative (˜ vr =1 ) .
The third political group that we consider here are those citizens who locate their
political position in the “center” (c). Political participation is positively perceived in
this group (˜ πc = 1) but we would expect no prescription with respect to the issue up
for vote (ac =0 ) . 12 Finally, there are individuals who are not politically mobilized
and who do not belong to these three groups (they are denoted by n). We assume
that there are no prescriptions with respect to participation and voting decisions in
this group (an =0 ,b n = 0). The econometric framework will enable us to test these
economic intuitions.
The voting and participation choices of individuals belonging to these four po-
litical groups can be summarized as follows:
¯ vi = pui + arδr,i − alδl,i, (9)
12In the empirical implementation of the model, we test this assumption that the “center” group
does not give any prescription with respect to the vote.
10¯ ci = Ci + arδr,i + alδl,i − brδr,i − blδl,i − bcδc,i. (10)
where ui is given by (7), δr,i, δl,i and δc,i are dummies for political right, left and cen-
ter respectively. The decisions to participate and to vote are based on the variables
¯ vi and ¯ ci. Individual i participates in the vote if |¯ vi| > ¯ ci. In case she participates,
the individual posts a vote in favor of the popular initiative if ¯ v∗
i > 0a n dan e g a t i v e
vote otherwise.
This model yields an interesting prediction for participation behavior. Individu-
als are likely to participate in the vote if their personal position (as represented by
the sign of ui) is in agreement with the voting prescription of the political group the
individual adheres to. By contrast, “cross-pressured” individuals whose personal
interests are in opposition to the recommended vote of their group are more likely
to abstain (see Fiorina 1976 for a similar result).
Finally it is worth noting that equations (9) and (10) enable us to test whether
the extended political-identity model provides a more adequate explanation of voting
and participation behavior than the “pure” rational voter model. Indeed, the case
where only instrumental motivations matter for the vote on migration policy is
obtained by setting ac = bc = 0 for all c.
3 Econometric implementation
In order to account for observable and unobservable heterogeneity in preferences and
participation costs, we add socio-demographic variables and error terms to equations
(9) and (10), and write them in vector notation as
¯ vi =¯ α
 xi +¯  i (11)
¯ ci =¯ γ
 zi + ¯ ξi, (12)
The vectors xi and zi contain the variables suggested by our model as well as socio-
demographic characteristics. As we only observe discrete voting and participation
behavior, the variances of these errors terms (say, σ2
v and σ2
c) cannot be identiﬁed.
Therefore, we reparameterize the above two equations in such a way that the error








 zi + ξi, (14)
11where Var( i)=V a r ( ξi)=1a n dC o v (  i,ξ i)=ρ. We will assume normality of ( i,ξ i)
for constructing the likelihood function for our model.
The utility index and participation costs are both latent variables in our model;
only the binary variables πi (participation) and vi (vote) are observed. Moreover,
the vote is observed only if the individual has chosen to participate. Indeed, the
data we use in this paper stem from individual surveys carried out during the two
weeks following a vote on immigration policy. People were asked whether they had
participated in the vote and, if the answer was aﬃrmative, how they had voted.
Let us recall that individual i participates if |¯ vi| > ¯ ci.N o t i n gt h a t¯ vi = σvv∗
i and
¯ ci = σcc∗
i and letting λ = σc/σv, the above condition can be rewritten as |v∗
i| >λ c ∗
i.






i| >λ c ∗
i
0 otherwise.








Note that πi is observed for all and vi is observed only if πi =1 .
The probability of being in favor of the popular initiative is
Pr(vi = 1) = Pr(v
∗
i > 0) = Φ(α
 xi)
where Φ(·) denotes the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal vari-
able. Therefore the probability of being opposed to the proposal up for vote is
Pr(vi = 0) = Pr(v
∗
i < 0) = 1 − Φ(α
 xi)
The individuals surveyed can be classiﬁed into three categories: those who vote
and say yes (πi =1 ,v i = 1, say group G1), those who vote and say no (πi =1 ,v i =0 ,
group G2) and those who do not vote (πi =0 ,g r o u pG0). Let us calculate these
three probabilities needed for writing the likelihood.
The ﬁrst group G1 is characterized by the two conditions v∗
i > 0a n dv∗
i >λ c ∗
i.
These two conditions can be restated as − i <α  xi and λξi −  i <α  xi − γ zi.T h e




⎣ 11 − λρ
1 − λρ 1+λ2 − 2λρ
⎤
⎦
Therefore, the probability of participating in the vote and voting yes is












where Φ2(·,·,r) denotes the joint cumulative distribution of a standard bivariate
normal with correlation r.
Individuals belong to category G2 if the conditions v∗
i < 0a n d−v∗
i >λ c ∗
i are
satisﬁed. These two conditions can be reformulated as  i < −α xi and λξi +  i <
−α xi − γ zi.T h e v a r i a b l e s  i and ˜ ti = λξi +  i jointly follow a bivariate normal
distribution with variance-covariance matrix
Σ2 =
⎡
⎣ 11 + λρ
1+λρ 1+λ2 +2 λρ
⎤
⎦
Consequently, the probability of participating in the vote and voting no is












Finally, the probability of not participating in the vote is
Pr(πi =0 )=1− Pr(πi =1 ,v i =1 )− Pr(πi =1 ,v i =0 ) .




[πivi logPr(πi =1 ,v i =1 )+πi(1 − vi)logPr(πi =1 ,v i =0 )
+(1 − πi)logPr(πi =0 ) ]
4 Data
The data used in our empirical application were collected after the vote in September
2000 on a popular initiative asking for a limitation of the number of foreigners in
Switzerland. The proposed change in the Constitution stated that the share of
13foreigners in the Swiss population could not exceed 18 percent. Some categories
of resident foreigners would have been excluded from this count (e.g. academics,
artists), but some non-residents would have been included (e.g. asylum seekers).
According to this deﬁnition, the share of foreigners was 19.3 percent at the time
of the vote. Therefore the initiative would have forced the government to limit
immigration severely. As the debate during the campaign made clear, immigration
limits would have been expected to apply to less-skilled workers in particular. The
popular initiative was rejected by 63.7 percent of voters and the participation rate
was 43.6 percent.
The individual-level VOX survey was carried out during the two weeks following
the vote and includes 1024 Swiss citizens over 18 years old. After elimination of
missing data, our sample consists of 953 individuals of which 507 reported that they
had participated in the vote. Among the latter, 28.8 percent said they had voted in
favor of the popular initiative. Therefore the participation rate in our sample (53.2
percent) is higher and the share of yes-votes is lower than in the general population.
According to the theoretical model, human capital (or skill) is a crucial variable
that determines attitudes towards immigration. We carefully explore the role of
this variable by using alternatively two diﬀerent measures of skill. The ﬁrst one,
a measure of educational attainment, was constructed as an indicator of years of
schooling according to the education types reported in the survey (descriptive sta-
tistics of variables are given in Table 1).
Second, we use a wider measure of human capital by including also on-the-job
training. The two types of skills — schooling and on-the-job training — can be
aggregated into a common indicator by appealing to Mincer’s concept of potential
earnings. In Mincer’s framework, observed wages and potential earnings are closely
linked. To construct an indicator of Potential earnings, we ran a standard Mincer
wage equation on data from the Swiss wage structure survey. The earnings indicator
is constructed using the following equation:
log(earnings)=c s t+0 .04experience − 0.0005experience
2 +0 .09schooling
where experience is deﬁned as: age-schooling-6.
In the survey, political beliefs of citizens are measured by a variable based on
the individual’s self-assessment of her political position on a scale between 0 (left)
and 10 (right). The dummy variables deﬁning political identity in our model are
derived from this variable. Almost half of the population choose to represent their
position at the center of the scale. Those who pick a number between 0 and 4 are
14classiﬁed as being on the “left” and numbers between 6 and 10 indicates adherence
to the “right”. Finally, those citizens who answer this question by “Don’t know”
form a (fourth) group of politically indiﬀerent citizens.
It is often argued that attitudes towards immigration depend on an individual’s
personal contacts with immigrants. To account for this possibility, we use a variable
measuring the share of foreigners in the population of the agglomeration where
the individual lives. There are also two regional dummy variables that allow for
diﬀerences in cultural and political attitudes between the three linguistic regions of
the country. In order to control for other types of heterogeneity in attitudes, we add
demographic variables (age, gender and marital status) to the preference equation
of the model. Note that these variables may also capture diﬀerences in belief about
the decisiveness of the vote.
Participation costs include resource and time costs that each individual incurs
for voting as well as for acquiring the necessary information. The act of voting
itself requires little time and eﬀort but not all cantons provide the possibility to
vote by correspondence. Hence the eﬀects of the absence of this possibility can be
tested using an appropriate dummy. Information costs are an important component
of participation costs and are likely to depend inversely on the level of education.
Finally a rural/urban distinction is also speciﬁed in the equation.
5 Empirical results
We are interested in identifying the determinants of attitudes towards immigration,
on the one hand, and in analyzing how these attitudes translate into actual political
decisions, on the other hand. For this purpose, we estimate our structural model
composed of equations (13) and (14), which enables us to identify the determinants
of both voting preferences and participation costs. Thus our model represents an
improvement on earlier studies of individual voting decisions such as de Melo et
al. (2004), Thalmann (2004) and Miguet (2007). These studies adopt a descriptive
approach in which the selection (i.e. participation choice) is taken into account in the
estimation of the voting equation through a bivariate probit model with censoring
(Van de Ven and van Praag; 1981). Their approach neither reﬂects a structural
model nor can it be interpreted as a reduced form.
155.1 Determinants of voting and participation behavior
As our measure of Potential earnings is by construction highly collinear with the
variables Years of education and Age, we use the two measures of skill alternatively in
the model. A similar problem arises with the dummy variable No postal vote since
cantons without the possibility to vote by correspondence are almost exclusively
located in the French and Italian speaking parts of Switzerland. Therefore, we
also estimate a version of the model where the French part and Italian part are
excluded from the model. Finally, we estimate a reduced version of the model which
excludes the political variables in order to compare a purely instrumental rational-
voter model with the extended formulation including political identity. Table 2
gives the estimated coeﬃcients for the six speciﬁcations, the top half of the table
containing the participation cost equation and the bottom half the vote equation.
Consider ﬁrst the question whether skill or human capital is a signiﬁcant deter-
minant of attitude towards immigration, as the theoretical model predicts. In all
four speciﬁcations that also include political identity variables (speciﬁcations (1) to
(4)), the inﬂuence of the human capital variable on the attitude towards immigra-
tion is signiﬁcant at the 10 or 5 percent level. These coeﬃcients have the expected
sign (recall that the initiative proposes to restrict immigration) and are determined
in the presence of political and demographic controls. Women and married individ-
uals have signiﬁcantly less restrictive attitudes towards immigration. The linguistic
region and the share of foreigners in the individual’s agglomeration do not seem to
have a signiﬁcant impact on attitudes.13
It should be emphasized that the use of a structural model that accounts ex-
plicitly for the participation decision has an important inﬂuence on the results. If
preferences towards immigration are estimated by a simple probit using only the
subsample of 507 individuals who participated in the vote, the coeﬃcients of human
capital variables are biased downward and are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero
even at the 10 percent level (see Table A1 in the Appendix). By contrast, the impact
of political variables seems to be overestimated in this partial model.
Returning to the results of the full model in Table 2, it is obvious that the role of
age depends on the choice of the human capital indicator. In speciﬁcations (1) and
(3) where skill is measured by Years of education, attitudes towards immigration
become less restrictive with age until the age of 53 years; beyond that age attitudes
13Scheve and Slaughter (2001) use a similar variable to test the “area-analysis” model which
assumes that labor markets are geographically segmented. As our results make clear, we do not
ﬁnd any support of this theory for the Swiss case.
16revert again to a more restrictive position. This age proﬁle is close to an earnings
proﬁle; it is therefore not surprising to ﬁnd that age has no signiﬁcant inﬂuence on
attitudes when Potential earnings are used as an indicator of skills.
This result points to an identiﬁcation problem: with our data it is very diﬃcult
to identify separately the inﬂuence of education, human capital and age on prefer-
ences towards immigration. It is also possible that higher education leads to greater
openness and tolerance towards other cultures. Therefore, there might be two chan-
nels that lead from education to immigration preferences: the tolerance channel and
the human capital or economic channel. An interesting way out of this dilemma has
been suggested by Scheve and Slaughter (2001). According to the theoretical model,
human capital should matter only for those who are in the labor force. Therefore it
is instructive to estimate separately the model on two sub-samples: those who are
in the labor force and those who are not.
If the “human capital channel” is more inﬂuential than increased tolerance due to
education, then the variables Years of education and Potential earnings should have
a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on attitudes towards immigration only for those individuals in
the labor force. This is indeed what we ﬁnd when we estimate speciﬁcations (3) and
(4) on the two sub-samples. If the ratio of variances is ﬁxed at the level which was
found when we were using the entire sample14, the coeﬃcients of Years of education
and Potential earnings are signiﬁcant at the 5 resp. 1 percent level for the sub-sample
of individuals in the labor force (see Table 3). For the remainder of the sample, these
two variables have no signiﬁcant inﬂuence on immigration preferences.15
Returning again to the full sample in Table 2, it is instructive that hardly any
parameter is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero when political variables are completely
dropped from the model (speciﬁcations (5) and (6)). The inﬂuence of human capital
variables on immigration restrictions cannot be identiﬁed with a model taking only
economic factors into account. A likelihood-ratio test conﬁrms the conclusion that
political variables should not be removed from the model. This implies that a pure
rational voter model, based solely on instrumental motivations, does not oﬀer a
suﬃcient explanation of observed behavior.
This result reﬂects a recent evolution in Swiss politics. In the 1980s, attitudes
14We were unable to estimate all parameters of the model for the two sub-samples due to
numerical problems. Therefore we ﬁxed λ at the level reported in Table 2. In order to test
the sensitivity of the results to the value of λ chosen, we reestimated the model ﬁxing λ =1 ,
which did not alter the coeﬃcient estimates of the vote equation in a signiﬁcant manner (results
are available upon request).
15It is interesting to note that the eﬀect of Years of education on participation costs is identical
(and highly signiﬁcant) in the two sub-samples.
17towards immigration were hardly inﬂuenced by political partisanship. With the
rise of a populist right-wing party in Switzerland, the issue of migration became
increasingly politicized during the 1990s. An established right-wing party, the Swiss
People’s party (SVP/UDC), became more radical by adopting a program with strong
national-populist elements, including a tough stance on immigration (Kriesi and
Lachat, 2004).
“Right” and “left” political identities signiﬁcantly inﬂuence attitudes towards
immigration. The estimated coeﬃcients reveal a strong polarization of political
opinions on the immigration issue between these two groups. As we had conjectured,
there do not seem to be particular prescriptions for the voting behavior of the centrist
group (i.e. these prescriptions do not signiﬁcantly diﬀer from those of politically
indiﬀerent individuals).
In order to compare our results on attitudes towards immigration with the ﬁnd-
ings of Scheve and Slaughter (2001) for the US, we address the question as to how
changes in skill levels or human capital aﬀect the probability of supporting immi-
gration restrictions in a quantitative sense. Scheve and Slaughter (2001) evaluate
the importance of skill variables by simulating the eﬀect of the increase from the
mean to the maximum observed in the sample, holding other variables constant at
their sample means. According to our model, increasing Potential earnings from
the mean (5.848) to the maximum observed in the sample (10.278) decreases the
probability of being in favor of immigration restrictions by 18.4 percent. This value
is in the range of the estimates obtained by Scheve and Slaughter for their variable
Occupation wage in the US.16
Another interesting question is how the quantitative impact of political variables
on attitudes towards immigration compares with the eﬀect of human capital. The
value found for Potential earnings is indeed comparable to the diﬀerence between
the preferences of a centrist individual and a member of the right (the probability of
being in favor of immigration restrictions is 13.8 percent higher) or a member of the
Left (the probability is 20.0 percent lower). These ﬁgures can be found in Table A2
(in the appendix) which reports the marginal eﬀects of selected variables.
Before discussing the relation between voting preferences and the outcome of
the vote, it is useful to examine the determinants of participation costs. The results
of speciﬁcations (1) to (4) in Table 2 make clear that a higher level of education
reduces signiﬁcantly the costs of participation, presumably because of its impact on
16The estimated decrease in the probability of supporting immigration restrictions range from
8.6 percent (in 1992) to 33.7 percent (in 1994). Our value is closest to their estimate for 1996 (20.1
percent).
18information costs. It has also been conjectured that higher educated citizens are
better integrated in society and therefore feel a greater sense of civic duty.17 The
same might be the case for married individuals who face lower participation costs
than unmarried individuals according to our estimations.
The structural model enables us to address the question whether the possibility of
voting by correspondence reduces the costs of participation. Because of the problems
of collinearity with regional variables discussed above, it is not easy to disentangle
this eﬀect from cultural diﬀerences in our sample. The results reﬂect this diﬃculty:
the absence of the possibility to cast a postal vote indeed seems to increase the
cost of participation, but this eﬀect if only signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level in
speciﬁcation (1) of the model.
What is the role of political identity in the participation decision? The results in
Table 2 suggest that politically indiﬀerent individuals feel no particular obligation
to vote, as we had conjectured above. Hence they face signiﬁcantly higher (implicit)
participation costs than the members of the centrist group. On the other hand,
those who belong to the politically engaged groups of the right and the left tend
to feel more pressured to vote than the centrist group (but this diﬀerence is only
statistically signiﬁcant for the group of the left in speciﬁcations (3) and (4) of the
model).
A clearer interpretation of these results can be obtained by considering the struc-
tural parameters of the identity-related part of the utility function (see equation (8)).
These parameters can be identiﬁed using a priori assumptions on group prescrip-
tions for the voting decision.18 Table 4 reports estimated values of these parameters
for speciﬁcation (4) of the model (we take this model to illustrate as it has the
highest likelihood values and the lowest AIC value; other speciﬁcations yield sim-
ilar results). With the reference group being the “center”, prescriptions seem to
be slightly stronger for the left than for the right. Interestingly, for both groups
the intensity of the prescription for voting behavior is approximately equal to the
intensity of prescription for participation behavior. This implies that casting the
“wrong” vote (according to the prescription of the group) yields the same utility
17Interestingly, the total impact of a marginal change in education on the outcome of the vote is
negligible (see Table A2). Although such a change tilts preferences against immigration restrictions,
this is compensated by a fall in participation costs which beneﬁts more the yes-voters than the
no-voters (see Table A2).
18The assumptions of the groups of the right and the left are discussed in section 2.3 above. The
only diﬀerence with the theoretical discussion concerns the group of politically indiﬀerent voters.
As we did not want to constrain the parameters of the econometric model, we assume implicitly
that the voting prescription of this group is “vote yes” but this eﬀect is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from the prescription of the centrist group.
19than not participating in the vote. Therefore, the estimation results imply that
cross-pressured citizens — whose economic interests are in contradiction with their
political identity — are unlikely to vote. Finally, the parameters of the politically
indiﬀerent group do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from those of the centrist group.
5.2 Outcome of the vote and participation bias
Does the outcome of the vote reﬂect underlying preferences in the population? If
this is not the case, the voting process exhibits a “participation bias”. We deﬁne
the participation bias as the diﬀerence between the outcome of the vote and the
(estimated) attitudes towards immigration restrictions in the entire population. As
attitudes are not observed among non-voters, this bias can only be estimated with
the help of a structural model.
In formal terms, the participation bias B is equal to the diﬀerence between the
probability of being in favor of the popular initiative conditional on participation,
Pr(v =1 |π = 1), and the marginal probability of being in favor of the popular
initiative, Pr(v = 1). The participation bias measures the diﬀerence between the
outcome of the vote and the result that would have been obtained if the voting and
participation decisions were independent:
PB =P r ( v =1 |π =1 )− Pr(v =1 )=
Pr(π =1 ,v=1 )− Pr(v =1 )P r ( π =1 )
Pr(π =1 )
When evaluated at the means of the explanatory variables, these probabilities
reveal a strong negative participation bias (see Table 5). Whereas 46 percent of the
population are in favor of the popular initiative, the outcome of the vote is very
diﬀerent: only 27 percent of those who participate cast a positive vote.19 Obviously,
such a large bias can only result from large diﬀerences in turnout rates between
advocates and opponents of the popular initiative. The formal relation between the
participation bias and the diﬀerence in turnout rates is
PB =
 
Pr(π =1 |v =1 )− Pr(π =1 |v =0 )
Pr(π =1 |v =1 )
 
Pr(v =0 )P r ( v =1 |π =1 )
and the numbers in Table 5 conﬁrm that there is a huge diﬀerence in participation
19Interestingly, an opinion poll commissioned by Swiss television and carried out shortly before
the vote in July 2000 came to the conclusion that almost half of Swiss voters were in favor of the
popular initiative: 40% of respondents were in favor of the popular initiative, 42% against and 17%
did not have an opinion (See the newspaper article ”Un sondage sur l’initiative des 18% secoue ses
opposants”, Le Temps, 17 July 2000.)
20probabilities between the two sides.
What is the source of this diﬀerence in turnout rates? To answer this question,
it is instructive to decompose the participation bias into two components, isolating
thereby the inﬂuence of the correlation ρ between unobserved factors in the voting
preference equation and unobserved factors in the participation cost equation. This
decomposition is deﬁned as follows:
PB =P r ( v =1 |π =1 ;ρ) − Pr(v =1 |π =1 ;0 )
      
bias due to correlation
+Pr(v =1 |π =1 ;0 )− Pr(v =1 )
      
bias due to other factors
As the result of the decomposition in Table 5 makes clear, almost the entire partici-
pation bias is due to the correlation between unobserved factors in the two equations.
In economic terms, this correlation can be interpreted as follows. Individuals who
are in favor of restrictions to immigration for reasons not taken into account by the
variables of the model also tend to have high participation costs.
Further insights can be gained by calculating predicted probabilities of partici-
pation for every individual in the sample. In Figure 2 (c), these predicted proba-
bilities are plotted against predicted probabilities of voting yes. Among supporters
of the initiative, the predicted probability of participation is obviously much more
dispersed (and in general smaller) than among opponents.
The source of this dispersion can be found by decomposing the predicted proba-
bility of participation into a sum of the probability of participating and voting yes,
and the probability of participating and voting no. These two predicted probabili-
ties are depicted in panels (a) and (b) of Figure 1. As these predicted probabilities
are shown for given probabilities of voting in favor of the initiative, vertical dis-
persion can only be explained by heterogeneous participation costs. There is little
dispersion in the predicted probability of participating and voting no, whereas the
predicted probability of participating and voting yes is highly dispersed among sup-
porters of the initiative.20 A positive correlation ρ between unobserved factors acts
as an ampliﬁer of observed heterogeneity in participation costs with respect to the
probability of participating and voting yes (see equation (15)). It has the opposite
impact on the probability of participating and voting no (see equation (16)) which
explains the asymmetry of dispersion in Figure 2 (c).
We end this section with a few remarks on the value of ρ used in our calculations.
20As the predicted probability of participating and voting no is always smaller than the predicted
probability of voting no, all points in panel (a) of Figure 1 lie below a straight line relating the
points (0,1) and (1,0). For similar reasons, in panel (b) all points lie below a straight line going
through the origin with slope 1.
21From Table 2 one can observe that the best speciﬁcation in terms of log-likelihood
and AIC values (speciﬁcation (4)) is also the only one with a ρ signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero (0.705). The participation bias was calculated using this value of ρ.N o t e
that a lower (higher) value of ρ would have led to a lower (higher) participation bias.
As the value of ρ explains such an important share of the participation bias,
one might wonder whether an important variable has been omitted from the model.
A possible candidate is the amount of interest in politics expressed in the survey
(Brady et al., 1995; Miguet, 2007). When this variable is added to the participation
cost equation, ρ turns out to be non signiﬁcant. However, the subjective nature of
this variable makes it potentially endogenous. If we instrument it by using dummy
variables capturing membership of diﬀerent types of association (church, arts and
crafts, trade union, employees), ρ becomes signiﬁcant and close to our previous
estimate.
6 Conclusions
This paper is a novel attempt to explain participation and voting behavior in a
direct democracy by formulating and estimating a structural model. The model is
used to uncover determinants of attitudes towards immigration, on the one hand,
and to analyze the link between attitudes and political outcome, on the other. We
account for expressive motivations for voting by introducing political identity into
the model. The pure rational voter model, including only instrumental motivations
for voting, can be obtained as a special case.
The direct democracy in Switzerland provides an institutional context that avoids
the hypothetical bias which hampers the analysis of opinion polls. In our empirical
application, the pure rational voter model turns out to be inadequate although the
variables that capture instrumental motivations are found to explain a signiﬁcant
part of the voting and participation decisions. In particular, human capital is an
important determinant of attitudes towards immigration. This result is conﬁrmed
by the fact that education is only signiﬁcant in the subsample of individuals in
the labor force, which tends to exclude the possibility that our education variable
captures other inﬂuences such as openness and tolerance towards other cultures.
Our results show that Chiswick and Hatton’s (2003) observation (as to the dis-
crepancy between immigration policies and popular demands for tighter immigration
control) also applies in the direct democracy case where the link between individual
attitudes and political outcome is much more direct than in a representative democ-
22racy. In the particular vote that we analyze in this paper, there seems to have been
a weak mobilization of citizens in favor of immigration restrictions and a relatively
strong mobilization of individuals opposed to such restrictions. Our model, and the
available data, do not allow to identify the factors that were responsible for this
participation bias since it is mainly explained by the positive correlation between
the error terms in the voting and participation cost equations.
In future work it would be interesting to search for explanations of the participa-
tion bias at a deeper level and address the question whether it occurs in other votes.
The evidence accumulated by political scientists might be helpful in this respect.
Analyzing a large number of direct democratic votes in Switzerland, Kriesi (2005)
argues that citizens with a low level of political awareness and little cognitive abili-
ties tend to use simple heuristic strategies when deciding how to vote and whether
to participate. Following this line of thinking, it can be conjectured that individuals
who are opposed to immigration in a rather vague sense also tend to use simple
heuristic strategies in their voting and participation decisions. Voting in favor of
an initiative that proposes to restrict immigration is in contradiction with the two
simplest heuristic strategies described by Kriesi (2005), the “status quo” heuristic
and the “trust” heuristic.21 This contradiction gives rise to cross-pressures, which
might have led these individuals to abstain.
By contrast, citizens with a high level of political awareness might have been
particularly motivated to participate (and vote no) by the fact that the proposed
initiative would have put in danger the ratiﬁcation of the bilateral agreements be-
tween Switzerland and the European Union. These bilateral agreements, which
included the free movement of persons, had been massively accepted in a popular
vote four months earlier and members of the main political parties had emphasized
their overruling importance during the campaign. Thus it may be useful to extend
our model to take into account the strategies of information acquisition and the role
of the political elite in the direct democratic context.
21The “status quo” heuristic consists in voting systematically ”no”, favoring thereby the current
state of aﬀairs when the alternative is uncertain. This strategy reﬂects a high degree of risk
aversion. Individual using the “trust” heuristic put their trust in the government and generally
follow its propositions. In our case, the government had recommended to reject the initiative.
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Figure 1: Probability of participation and probability of being in favor of immigra-
tion restrictions 
Table 1: Summary statistics 
a 
 
Variable Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Vote 0.288   
Participation 0.532   
Education (years)  12.488  2.128 
Potential earnings  5.848  1.570 
Political: right  0.190   
Political: left  0.208   
Political: center  0.461   
Political: don’t know  0.142   
No postal vote  0.222   
Rural 0.331   
Share foreigners in agglomeration  0.196  0.066 
French part  0.228   
Italian part  0.068   
Age 47.805  17.522 
Female 0.498   
Married 0.563   
 
a There are 953 observations for all variables except the Vote (507 observations).  



















 Table 2: Estimation results for the popular initiative in 2000 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
Participation costs 
Education (years)  -0.135**  -0.129**  -0.121*** -0.111*** -0.102  -0.109 
  (0.065) (0.065) (0.046) (0.038) (0.083)  (0.091) 
No  postal  vote  0.494*  0.474 0.025 0.008 0.019  0.023 
  (0.287) (0.295) (0.150) (0.135) (0.126)  (0.139) 
Rural  0.258  0.252  0.225* 0.205* 0.130 0.144 
  (0.160) (0.159) (0.121) (0.112) (0.163)  (0.168) 
Political:  right  -0.421 -0.403 -0.386 -0.325    
  (0.326) (0.335) (0.284) (0.266)    
Political: left  -0.389  -0.375  -0.412*  -0.396**     
  (0.260) (0.243) (0.247) (0.190)    
Political: don't know  0.620**  0.604**  0.512**  0.484***     
  (0.293) (0.291) (0.201) (0.176)    
French  part      0.232 0.216 0.374**  0.376* 
      (0.162) (0.148) (0.186)  (0.197) 
Italian part      1.029***  0.964***  0.690  0.726 
      (0.376) (0.331) (0.438)  (0.477) 
Age  -0.041 -0.039 -0.038 -0.037*  -0.021  -0.024 
  (0.026) (0.025) (0.023) (0.019) (0.037)  (0.037) 
Age2/1000  0.232 0.222 0.228 0.229 0.062  0.091 
  (0.227) (0.214) (0.220) (0.187) (0.338)  (0.319) 
Female  0.145 0.140 0.093 0.074 0.272  0.268 
  (0.151) (0.151) (0.133) (0.121) (0.178)  (0.172) 
Married -0.487**  -0.471*  -0.407** -0.379***  -0.205  -0.229 
  (0.247) (0.245) (0.174) (0.147) (0.259)  (0.269) 
Constant  3.779*** 3.640*** 3.437*** 3.232*** 2.796  2.958 
  (1.429) (1.405) (1.018) (0.814) (1.765)  (1.907) 
Voting preferences 
Education  (years)  -0.055*   -0.058*   -0.003   
  (0.030)   (0.034)   (0.061)   
Potential earnings    -0.100*    -0.111**    -0.015 
    (0.051)   (0.051)   (0.098) 
Share foreigners in agglom.  -1.059  -1.040  -1.154  -1.049  -0.567  -0.610 
  (0.713) (0.707) (0.752) (0.748) (0.900)  (0.857) 
Political:  right  0.413***  0.414***  0.360** 0.349**    
  (0.154) (0.150) (0.183) (0.162)    
Political:  left  -0.548*** -0.543*** -0.534*** -0.523***    
  (0.144) (0.145) (0.140) (0.131)    
Political:  don't  know  0.202 0.197 0.236 0.243    
  (0.208) (0.201) (0.202) (0.181)    
French part      0.003  -0.003  -0.210  -0.195 
      (0.138) (0.125) (0.240)  (0.208) 
Italian  part      0.416 0.422 0.022  0.064 
      (0.321) (0.269) (0.530)  (0.470) 
Age -0.050***  -0.025  -0.051*** -0.024  -0.027  -0.025 
  (0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019) (0.027)  (0.020) 
Age2/1000  0.470***  0.287 0.480***  0.273 0.338  0.325* 
  (0.173) (0.191) (0.165) (0.183) (0.221)  (0.185) 
Female -0.200*  -0.200*  -0.184* -0.179* -0.283**  -0.279** 
  (0.110) (0.109) (0.105) (0.100) (0.137)  (0.130) 
Married -0.247**  -0.236**  -0.255** -0.246** -0.118  -0.129 
  (0.122) (0.118) (0.124) (0.111) (0.177)  (0.159) 
Constant  2.102** 1.303** 2.237** 1.408***  0.163  0.226 
  (0.866) (0.557) (0.968) (0.509) (2.018)  (1.079) 
Rho  0.539 0.543 0.645 0.705**  -0.562  -0.445 
  (0.371) (0.360) (0.422) (0.340) (1.174)  (1.151) 
Lambda  1.026*  0.979*  0.851** 0.775** 0.684  0.698 
  (0.585) (0.590) (0.421) (0.335) (0.524)  (0.580) 
Log  likelihood  -828.531 -828.438 -818.712 -818.430 -870.202  -870.191 
AIC  1703.06 1702.88 1691.42 1690.86 1782.40  1782.38 
Notes:    Standard errors in parentheses,  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, N = 953. Table 3: Estimation results for working and not working individuals 
 Working  individuals  Not  working 
Specification  (3) (4) (3) (4) 
Participation costs 
Education  (years)  -0.126*** -0.114*** -0.111*** -0.101** 
  (0.032) (0.027) (0.039) (0.044) 
No postal vote  -0.076  -0.081  0.103  0.071 
  (0.149) (0.109) (0.280) (0.264) 
Rural 0.161  0.124  0.350*  0.305 
  (0.108) (0.083) (0.183) (0.225) 
Political: right  -0.168  -0.057  -0.676**  -0.672*** 
  (0.251) (0.169) (0.321) (0.223) 
Political: left  -0.437***  -0.431***  -0.423  -0.326 
  (0.153) (0.126) (0.364) (0.408) 
Political: don't know  0.300  0.263  0.681***  0.605** 
  (0.204) (0.182) (0.263) (0.292) 
French part  0.363*  0.308**  0.068  0.127 
  (0.190) (0.150) (0.336) (0.308) 
Italian part  0.913**  0.765***  1.321**  1.154* 
  (0.375) (0.275) (0.590) (0.651) 
Age -0.064**  -0.069***  -0.037  -0.032 
  (0.031) (0.026) (0.031) (0.031) 
Age2/1000 0.589*  0.661**  0.172  0.129 
  (0.355) (0.300) (0.308) (0.305) 
Female -0.022  -0.048  0.264  0.285 
  (0.122) (0.103) (0.263) (0.210) 
Married -0.488***  -0.431***  -0.298  -0.258 
  (0.126) (0.113) (0.184) (0.202) 
Constant 3.902***  3.766***  3.430***  3.233*** 
  (0.704) (0.642) (0.866) (0.951) 
Voting preferences 
Education (years)  -0.074**    -0.033   
 (0.034)    (0.059)   
Potential earnings    -0.174***    -0.038 
   (0.052)    (0.087) 
Share foreigners in agglom.  -1.157  -0.819  -0.839  -0.754 
  (0.922) (0.747) (1.398) (1.372) 
Political: right  0.378**  0.357**  0.242  0.302 
  (0.181) (0.157) (0.328) (0.297) 
Political: left  -0.599***  -0.564***  -0.359  -0.325 
  (0.145) (0.139) (0.263) (0.265) 
Political: don't know  0.105  0.125  0.375  0.282 
  (0.214) (0.197) (0.441) (0.445) 
French part  0.135  0.128  -0.242  -0.259 
  (0.154) (0.142) (0.223) (0.216) 
Italian  part  0.215 0.251 0.982 0.794 
  (0.293) (0.242) (0.777) (0.778) 
Age -0.093***  -0.050*  -0.024  -0.012 
  (0.028) (0.030) (0.033) (0.031) 
Age2/1000 0.976***  0.651**  0.256  0.181 
  (0.321) (0.322) (0.282) (0.289) 
Female  -0.166 -0.163 -0.230 -0.253 
  (0.117) (0.112) (0.212) (0.203) 
Married -0.342**  -0.341***  -0.134  -0.105 
  (0.135) (0.123) (0.190) (0.187) 
Constant 3.477***  2.341***  0.908  0.173 
  (0.800) (0.586) (2.024) (1.313) 
Rho 0.854***  0.932***  0.212  -0.098 
  (0.183) (0.071) (1.234) (1.240) 
Lambda (fixed)   0.851  0.775  0.851  0.775 
Number  of  observations 592 592 359 359 
Log  likelihood  -503.323 -501.839 -301.928 -301.901 
Notes:    Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  




b   Coefficient  Std.  error 
Vote 
Right  r a ˆ 2   0.697** 0.324 
Left  l a ˆ 2  1.045*** 0.263 
Don’t know  i a ˆ 2  0.486 0.362 
Participation 
Right 
r b ˆ   0.674* 0.350 
Left 
l b ˆ   0.919*** 0.278 
Don’t know 
i b ˆ   -0.240 0.212 
 
a  Estimates are derived from model (4) in Table 2. 
b  Reference group is “Center” 
 
  
Table 5: Participation bias and its explanations 
 
Participation bias and its elements 
Participation bias  ) 1 Pr( ) 1 | 1 Pr( = − = = v v π   -0.193 
Voting preferences  ) 1 Pr( = v    0.459 
Outcome of the vote  ) 1 | 1 Pr( = = π v    0.266 
Probabilities of participation by group of voters 
Participation among yes-voters  ) 1 | 1 Pr( = = v π    0.293 
Participation among no-voters  ) 0 | 1 Pr( = = v π    0.685 
Decomposition: role of correlation 
- Bias due to correlation  ) 0 ; 1 | 1 Pr( ) ; 1 | 1 Pr( = = − = = π ρ π v v -0.180 
- Bias due to other factors  ) 1 Pr( ) 0 ; 1 | 1 Pr( = − = = v v π   -0.012 
Note: All probabilities are calculated on the basis of model (4) using sample averages. Details of the decompositions 
are given in the text 
  
Table A1: Estimation results for the popular initiative in 2000  
    (Simple probit of voting preferences) 
 
Model  Complete Complete Complete Complete RV  model  RV  model 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Voting preferences 
Education  (years)  -0.038   -0.037   -0.026   
  (0.031)   (0.031)   (0.029)   
Potential  earnings    -0.079   -0.081   -0.057 
    (0.055)   (0.055)   (0.052) 
Share  foreigners  in  agglom.  -1.125 -1.092 -0.818 -0.742 -0.720 -0.670 
  (1.050) (1.051) (1.149) (1.154) (1.104) (1.108) 
Political:  right  0.602*** 0.606*** 0.606*** 0.611***    
  (0.147) (0.147) (0.148) (0.148)    
Political:  left  -0.672*** -0.674*** -0.662*** -0.663***    
  (0.187) (0.188) (0.188) (0.188)    
Political: don't know  0.005  -0.003  0.028  0.021     
  (0.265) (0.266) (0.269) (0.270)    
French  part    -0.117  -0.129  -0.189  -0.197 
    (0.181)  (0.181)  (0.174)  (0.174) 
Italian  part    -0.103  -0.122  0.072  0.060 
    (0.356)  (0.357)  (0.333)  (0.333) 
Age  -0.048*  -0.029 -0.048 -0.029 -0.039 -0.025 
  (0.025) (0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (0.024) (0.026) 
Age2/1000  0.512**  0.375 0.513**  0.374 0.458**  0.358 
  (0.235) (0.248) (0.235) (0.249) (0.225) (0.240) 
Female  -0.327** -0.337** -0.321** -0.332** -0.382***  -0.390*** 
  (0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.129) (0.129) 
Married  -0.208 -0.198 -0.206 -0.196 -0.207 -0.200 
  (0.147) (0.148) (0.147) (0.148) (0.140) (0.141) 
Constant  1.332*  0.787 1.287*  0.744 0.886 0.501 
  (0.745) (0.606) (0.749) (0.609) (0.699) (0.571) 
Observations  507 507 507 507 507 507 
Log_likelihood  -267.887 -267.572 -267.656 -267.287 -290.768 -290.562 
 
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
Table A2: Marginal effects of selected variables 
a 
 
  ) 1 Pr( = v   ) 1 | 1 Pr( = = π v   ) 1 , 1 Pr( = = v π   ) 0 , 1 Pr( = = v π   ) 1 Pr( = π  
Marginal effects of variables in voting equation (x) 
Potential earnings  -0.044  -0.063  -0.033  0.028  -0.006 
Political: right  0.138  0.210  0.122  -0.086  0.036 
Political: left  -0.200  -0.241  -0.123  0.130  0.007 
Political:don’t know  0.097  0.146  0.082  -0.060  0.023 
Married -0.097  -0.140  -0.075  0.061  -0.014 
Marginal effects of variables in participation cost equation (z) 
Education (years)    0.029  0.028  0.023  0.051 
Political: right    0.081  0.089  0.064  0.154 
Political: left    0.097  0.109  0.078  0.187 
Political:don’t know    -0.130  -0.100  -0.099  -0.200 
Married   0.100  0.094  0.077  0.171 
Combined marginal effects: variables in voting and participation cost equations 
Education 
b -0.023  -0.004  0.011  0.037  0.048 
Political: right  0.138  0.291  0.211  -0.021  0.189 
Political: left  -0.200  -0.144  -0.014  0.208  0.194 
Political:don’t know  0.097  0.016  -0.018  -0.159  -0.177 
Married -0.097  -0.040  0.018  0.138  0.156 
 
a Marginal effects are calculated using model (4). For a continuous variable, we report the marginal effect. For a 
dummy variable, we report the impact of a change in its value from 0 to 1. All other variables are evaluated at their 
sample means. 
b Includes the indirect effect of education through an increase in potential earnings. One additional year of schooling 
increases average potential earnings by 0.09 * (average potential earnings). 
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